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Abstract
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relations between posttraumatic
stress disorder’s (PTSD) dysphoria and reexperiencing factors and underlying dimensions
of rumination. 304 trauma-exposed primary care patients were administered the Stressful
Life Events Screening Questionnaire, PTSD Symptom Scale based on their worst traumatic
event, and Ruminative Thought Style Questionnaire (RTSQ). Confirmatory factor analyses
(CFAs) were conducted to determine the dysphoria and reexperiencing factors’ relation-
ships with the four factors of rumination. Results revealed that both the dysphoria and reex-
periencing factors related more to problem-focused thinking and anticipatory thoughts than
counterfactual thinking. Additionally, the reexperiencing factor related more to anticipatory
thinking than repetitive thinking. Clinical and theoretical implications are discussed.
Introduction
Recent research has examined cognitive mechanisms and their relations to posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) [1]. Rumination, the tendency to perseverate on negative emotions or events,
is one such mechanism. Little is known about the specific aspects of rumination that play a role
in PTSD development. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to investigate the relationship be-
tween several dimensions of PTSD and rumination. In order to comprehensively examine this
relationship, PTSD and rumination were compared at the latent factor-level.
Rumination and PTSD
Rumination can be defined as intrusive and repetitive negative thinking about past experiences
and/or emotions, and is relatively stable over time [2]. Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model of
PTSD [3, 4] posited that negative interpretations of the traumatic memory results in heightened
levels of distress, which in turn leads to such maladaptive cognitive strategies as rumination. In
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the context of this model, rumination has been deemed a possible cognitive avoidance strategy
[5], in which the person engages in rumination about the meaning, causes, and consequences of
the trauma, but not the actual events of the trauma [6]. This form of maladaptive coping [4] re-
sults in faulty processing and increased symptom expression (e.g. negative affect, reexperiencing)
[7]. Rumination has been found to longitudinally predict PTSD symptoms up to 6 months follow-
ing a traumatic event [8]. Michael, Halligan, Clark and Ehlers [9] found that assault survivors
with PTSD reported significantly more rumination overall, and more time spent ruminating than
assault survivors without PTSD. Furthermore, several types of rumination appear to affect PTSD
severity, such as ineffective thinking, perseveration over why something happened and what
would have happened had circumstances been different, and continued pressure to ruminate [9].
Rumination’s Underlying Structure
Several measures exist that define rumination from different theoretical perspectives and ap-
pear to measure different types of ruminative experiences. The more widely used rumination
questionnaires measure ruminative thinking about depression symptoms, rumination on sad-
ness and circumstances surrounding it, distress about intrusive thoughts following a distressing
event, and searching for meaning in negative experiences [10]. These different theoretical ap-
proaches to measuring rumination can provide challenges to understanding its mechanisms
and relations with other disorders, particularly regarding rumination’s factor structure.
One newer instrument for measuring rumination is the Ruminative Thought Style Question-
naire (RTSQ). This instrument was initially developed to measure a general style of ruminative
thinking that was not subject to bias by valence, item content, and time-specific information
[11], which is a limitation seen in other rumination measures. Another limitation the RTSQ ap-
pears to overcome is its focus on general style of ruminative thinking, and not just depressive
content [12]. This makes the RTSQ a promising global measure of rumination and worthy of
further investigation, particularly when it comes to assessing rumination’s relationships with
other disorders that do not necessarily fall under the umbrella of the depressive disorders.
Tanner, Voon, Hasking andMartin [12] used a large adolescent sample to investigate the under-
lying symptom dimensions of rumination measured by the Ruminative Thought Style Question-
naire [12]. They conducted an exploratory factor analysis (N = 1181), then a confirmatory factor
analysis (N = 1181), and found that a four-factor structure of rumination fit best, supporting rumi-
nation as a multi-dimensional construct [12]. The four factors were labeled as follows: problem-
focused thoughts, counterfactual thinking, repetitive thoughts, and anticipatory thoughts [12].
The first factor of rumination, problem-focused thoughts (R-PFT), can be conceptualized as
deficits in problem-solving ability and information processing, and was found to predict in-
creased levels of distress in the Tanner, Voon, Hasking and Martin [12] adolescent sample.
The second factor, counterfactual thinking (R-CT), is defined as imagining and perseverating
on imagined alternative outcomes to various situations that will happen and/or have all ready
happened, and is linked to emotions like regret, disappointment, shame, and guilt [12]. The
third factor is repetitive thoughts (R-RT) and focuses on the frequency and repetitiveness of
cognitions, with its most defining features being the persistence, intrusiveness, and involuntary
nature of the thoughts. This factor also increased levels of distress in the Tanner, Voon, Hask-
ing and Martin [12] sample. Lastly, the fourth factor, anticipatory thoughts (R-AT), is indica-
tive of intrusive and persistent perseveration over future possible events [12].
PTSD’s Underlying Structure
We investigated rumination’s relations with latent factors of PTSD. Early PTSD factor analytic
research has focused on the DSM-IV three-factor model [13]. In a literature review by Elhai
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and Palmieri [13], it was determined that there were two four-factor models that fit the symp-
tom structure of PTSD: the emotional numbing model [14] and the dysphoria model [15].
King, Leskin, King andWeathers [14] proposed an emotional numbing model of PTSD that
consists of four factors: reexperiencing (PTSD-RE), avoidance (PTSD-AV), numbing (PTSD-N),
and hyperarousal (PTSD-HYP). This model differs from three-factor models because it divides
numbing and avoidance into two distinct factors [14] (see Table 1). The dysphoria model of PTSD
(usingDSM-IV criteria) has four factors consisting of reexperiencing, avoidance, dysphoria (PTSD-
DYS), and hyperarousal symptoms [15]. In this model, the larger PTSD-DYS factor has eight
symptoms from theDSM-IV numbing and arousal factors that load onto it [15] (see Table 1).
There has been debate as to which model is the better fit for PTSD. Yufik and Simms [16]
conducted a meta-analysis in which they looked at 40 covariance matrices. These had different
PTSD assessments (based on DSM-IV) and different trauma samples. Their analysis revealed
the important findings that although the four-factor models have the best fit for PTSD, the dys-
phoria model had a consistently better fit than the emotional numbing model and this was not
affected by the measure used or the type of trauma sample [16].
Another PTSD model that has received strong support in the literature is the five-factor dys-
phoric arousal model [17]. In this model, the PTSD-RE factor is made up of the same five
symptoms as the other factor models of PTSD, and the PTSD-AV and PTSD-HYP (renamed
anxious arousal in the five-factor model) are unchanged from the emotional numbing model
[17]. The biggest change is that the PTSD-DYS factor is split into two factors, a numbing factor
and a dysphoric arousal factor [17] (see Table 1 for item mapping).
To date, these are the PTSD factor models that have received the most support in the literature,
with the majority of studies focusing on the four-factor emotional numbing and dysphoria models.
Rumination and PTSD Factors
We focus here on the dysphoria model in relation to dimensions of rumination. In comparison
to the numbing model, the dysphoria model has been documented with having a more consis-
tent, better fit across different trauma samples and using different assessment types [16]. Accord-
ing to Yufik and Simms [16] meta-analysis, the dysphoria model [15] fits these requirements
over the emotional numbing model [14]. There is evidence in the existing literature for the rela-
tively new five-factor dysphoric arousal model [17]. However, because no previous study has ex-
amined PTSD’s factor structure in relation to rumination, we believe it is best to start this line of
inquiry with the four-factor dysphoria model rather than the newer five-factor model.
In studying rumination’s relations to PTSD dimensions, we focus specifically on two specific
PTSD factors: dysphoria and reexperiencing. There are several reasons we choose to initially
focus on these two factors. Specific aspects of rumination could have distinctive relations to the
PTSD-RE factor. Several studies have shown that people engage in cognitive strategies such as
rumination in order to control the intrusive images, part of the PTSD-RE factor [5, 18]; howev-
er, there are no studies to date that have explored this research question.
We also focus on the PTSD-DYS factor for several reasons. Some of the symptoms from the
PTSD-DYS factor overlap with other mood and anxiety disorders (e.g., sleep, irritability, concentra-
tion problems, hopelessness, loss of interest). Forbes and colleagues [19] found that PTSD-HYP,
PTSD-RE, and PTSD-AV factors were more related to Fear disorders (e.g., disorders like simple
phobia, panic disorder, etc) and that the PTSD-DYS cluster of symptoms was more related to disor-
ders falling under the Anxious-Misery umbrella (e.g., generalized anxiety disorder and depression).
Additionally, a recent study by Gros, Simms and Acierno [20] suggested that the PTSD-DYS factor
was more related to depression than other PTSD factors, which could account for PTSD’s high co-
morbidity with depression. In addition to dysphoria, PTSD and depression also share many
PTSD’s Dysphoria and Reexperiencing Factors and Rumination Factors
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common cognitive processes, including rumination. In order to better understand this comorbid
relationship, it makes sense to study common symptom clusters (e.g., dysphoria) and common
cognitive processes (e.g., rumination) to determine if their co-relations play a role in PTSD develop-
ment and maintenance. Because both rumination and the PTSD-DYS factor are associated with
PTSD, depression, and general distress, it would be expected that dysphoria and rumination could
be related to each other; however this research question has also not been explicitly tested.
Aims
Because of the limited research on the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, particularly
rumination, and PTSD’s factor structure, it is important to investigate this area for its treat-
ment implications. This is especially important given rumination’s connections to PTSD symp-
tom maintenance and to PTSD and distress. Therefore, we specifically investigated the
relations between rumination’s dimensions and the PTSD-DYS and the PTSD-RE factor.
Doing so at the level of latent variables, rather than observed variables, ensures maximum pre-
cision in estimating the strength between variables.
Due to the exploratory nature of this study and the novelty of using the RTSQ as a measure
of rumination’s factor structure, we put forth the following hypothesis based predominantly on
theory: R-PFT is defined by Tanner, Voon, Hasking and Martin [12] as deficits in information
processing. This falls in line with Ehlers and Clark’s [3] theory of rumination’s role in PTSD
maintenance, in which people have negative appraisals of the traumatic event, resulting in
heightened symptom levels, and maladaptive coping strategies such as rumination that do not
allow sufficient processing of the negative event, resulting in even higher and prolonged symp-
tom levels (e.g., distress, more intrusive thoughts). We therefore hypothesize that R-PFT will
be most related to PTSD-RE and PTSD-DYS over other rumination factors.
Table 1. Item Mapping for PTSD Models.
Items DSM-IV Dysphoria Emotional Numbing 5-Factor Model
Intrusive thoughts R R R R
Nightmares R R R R
Reliving trauma R R R R
Emotional cue reactivity R R R R
Physiological cue reactivity R R R R
Avoidance of thoughts A, N A A A
Avoidance of reminder A, N A A A
Trauma-related amnesia A, N D N D
Loss of interest A, N D N D
Feeling detached A, N D N D
Feeling numb A, N D N D
Hopelessness A, N D N D
Difﬁculty sleeping H D H DA
Irritability/anger H D H DA
Difﬁculty concentrating H D H DA
Hypervigilance H H H AA
Easily startled H H H AA
Note: R = Reexperiencing, A = Avoidance, N = Numbing, H = Hyperarousal, D = Dysphoria, DA = Dysphoric Arousal, AA = Anxious Arousal
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118435.t001
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Method
Participants and Procedure
The data utilized in this study were part of a larger dataset originally featured in an article on
PTSD’s structure by Elhai, Naifeh, Forbes, Ractliffe and Tamburrino [21]. The University of
South Dakota’s Institutional Review Board approved this study. Data collection for this study
occurred in 2010 in a public, primary care clinic located in a medium-sized U.S. Midwestern
city. This clinic was affiliated with the state university medical school. Adults presenting to the
clinic between the ages of 18 to 65 were recruited to participate in a study and were informed
they would not receive any compensation. The study utilized an informed consent statement
that did not require the participants’ signature and was anonymous. Participants read the con-
sent statement and if they agreed to participate, were given the survey. This was part of a waiver
of signed consent granted by the University of South Dakota’s Institutional Review Board. The
survey was completely anonymous and did not ask for identifying information.
In total, 551 adults were recruited for study participation. Of those, 52 were excluded due to
either not speaking English or not being affiliated with the clinic. Out of the remaining 499 po-
tential participants, 411 agreed to participate (82% response rate).
Measures
The following demographic characteristics were collected: age, gender, years of education, race,
marital status, employment status, and household income.
The Stressful Life Events Screening Questionnaire (SLESQ) [22] is a self-report questionnaire
that assesses 12DSM-IV PTSD Criterion A traumatic events, as well as an additional “catch-all”
item. Questions were only asked about the traumas, with no follow-up questions about aspects of
the trauma. Participants were asked to specify the trauma they found most distressing. This ques-
tionnaire has demonstrated adequate test-retest reliability (κ = .73) and convergent validity [22].
The PTSD Symptom Scale (PSS) [23] is a 17-item self-report questionnaire that assesses for
PTSD symptoms based on DSM-IV criteria. Symptom severity over the past 2 weeks is rated
on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 3 (“5 or more times per week/very
much/almost always”), with higher scores indicating more severity. PTSD symptoms were
rated based on the most-distressing traumatic event reported by the participant on the SLESQ.
The questionnaire has good overall psychometrics, including good test-retest reliability
(κ = .74), internal consistency of. 91 (.94 in present sample), and convergent validity [23]. Al-
though the symptoms are self-reported, probable PTSD diagnosis was based on DSM-IV crite-
ria and symptoms were considered endorsed if the participant scored a 1 (“once per week or
less/a little bit/once in awhile”) or higher on an item.
The Ruminative Thought Style Questionnaire (RTSQ) [11] is a self-report questionnaire that
assesses for different types of ruminative thinking. It includes 20 items that are rated on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“does not describe me at all”) to 7 (“describes me very
well”). This measure has demonstrated adequate psychometrics, including the following: inter-
nal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .95; .94 in present sample) [11], and convergent validity with
the widely used Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ), Global Rumination Scale (GRS), and the
Beck-Depression Inventory-II [11]. Additionally, it appears to be a more global measure of ru-
minative thinking because it measures the overall general tendency to think repetitively, recur-
rently and intrusively [11] as compared to the RSQ, which focuses on rumination over
depressive content [12]. Drawing on a sample of college students, Brinker and Dozois [11] pro-
posed and validated a unitary construct of rumination, but a recent factor analytic study
yielded a better-fitting four-factor solution with 15 of the items [12]. The four factors were
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labeled as the following: problem-focused thoughts, counterfactual thinking, repetitive
thoughts, and anticipatory thoughts [12].
Exclusions and Missing Data
Two participants did not complete items on the SLESQ, leaving 409 participants that complet-
ed the questionnaire. Of these participants, 329 endorsed at least one traumatic event. Among
the 329 trauma-exposed participants, 19 did not answer items on the PSS, bringing the sample
size to 310. Six participants were excluded from additional analyses due to not completing over
50% of items on the RTSQ and/or PSS, resulting in a final sample size of 304. CFA analyses
were conducted with Mplus 7.1 software [24]. Missing values were estimated using maximum
likelihood procedures with a pairwise present approach.
Analysis
Three Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFAs) were conducted to examine the following models:
the dysphoria model of PTSD, four-factor rumination model, and combined dysphoria and four-
factor rumination model. Error covariances were fixed to zero, and factor variances were fixed to
1 to standardize factors in eachmodel. Goodness of fit indices (in addition to the chi-square statis-
tic, which has limitations) [25] that are reported below are the following: comparative fit index
(CFI), Tucker Lewis Index (TLI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Ac-
cording to Hu and Bentler [26], models with good fit (adequate fit statistics are in parentheses)
have the following fit statistics: CFI and TLI .95 (.90-.94) and RMSEA .06 (.07-.08).
The first CFA conducted was on the dysphoria model of PTSD. PSS items were treated as
ordinal, as research has shown this is the appropriate way to treat data with fewer than five re-
sponse options [27, 28]. To examine the dysphoria model of PTSD, we specified the following
factor loadings for the PSS items: items 1–5 on the PTSD-RE factor, items 6–7 on the PTSD-
AV factor, items 8–15 on the PTSD-DYS factor, and items 16–17 on the PTSD-HYP factor.
We used weighted least squares with a mean- and variance-adjusted (WLSMV) chi-square for
CFA, which is the preferred estimator for ordinal/categorical items [27, 28]. Next, we con-
ducted CFA on the 15 RTSQ items used to construct the four-factor rumination model [12].
Rumination items were treated as continuous, and we used maximum likelihood estimation
with robust standard errors. To examine the four-factor rumination model, RTSQ items 1–4
were specified to load onto the R-RT factor, RTSQ items 5–8 on the R-CT factor, RTSQ items
9 and 11–14 on the R-PFT factor, and RTSQ items 17 and 20 on the R-AT factor. Following
the recommendations of Tanner, Voon, Hasking and Martin [12], RTSQ items 10, 15–16, and
18–19 were not included in this model. Lastly, we examined the combined dysphoria and four-
factor rumination model by using a WLSMV estimator and allowing all factors to correlate.
We tested the null hypothesis that the difference between two correlations would be zero by
using Wald chi-square tests of parameter constraints. We examined which factors of rumina-
tion were most correlated with the PTSD-DYS factor and the PTSD-RE factor in the dysphoria
model of PTSD.
Results
Among the 304 trauma-exposed subjects, there were 109 men (35.9%). Age ranged from 19 to
64 years old (M = 42.56, SD = 11.66), and participants had between 7 to 19 years of education
(M = 12.89, SD = 2.12). Most identified their race and ethnicity as Caucasian (n = 244, 80.3%),
Native American (n = 30, 9.9%), and Hispanic (n = 28, 9.2%). Marital status was also recorded,
with the following percentages: single (n = 153, 50.3%), married (n = 86, 28.3%), and previously
married (n = 65, 21.4%). Most were employed part-time and full-time (n = 187, 61.5%), with the
PTSD’s Dysphoria and Reexperiencing Factors and Rumination Factors
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rest being either unemployed (n = 103, 33.9%), or retired (n = 14, 4.6%). Annual household in-
come level was the following:< $15,000 (n = 128, 42.1%), $15,000–$25,000 (n = 82, 27.0%),
$25,000–$35,000 (n = 48, 15.8%), $35,000-$50,000 (n = 26, 8.6%), and> $50,000 (n = 20, 6.6%).
Out of the 304 participants, 116 (38.2%) metDSM-IV criteria for a probable PTSD diagnosis.
Total prevalence of probable PTSD in our sample of 411 participants was 28.2%. This is higher
than the prevalence of PTSD in the general population [29]; however, since this is a primary care
sample the prevalence of PTSD would be expected to be higher since there is a large relationship
between both trauma and PTSD and utilization of healthcare [30, 31]. Total scores for the PSS in
the remaining participants (n = 304) ranged from 0 to 47, with an average score of 12.17 (SD =
12.09), and the RTSQ had scores ranging from 23 to 140, averaging 77.59 (SD = 25.46).
CFA results indicated an adequately-fitting four-factor dysphoria model of PTSD, robust
χ2(df = 113, N = 304) = 342.51, p< 0.001, CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.08 (see Table 2
and Table 3). The four-factor rumination model also had an adequate fit, Y—B χ2(df = 84, N =
304) = 251.55, p< 0.001, CFI = 0.92, TLI = 0.90, RMSEA = 0.08 (see Table 4 and Table 5). Last-
ly, the CFA for the combined dysphoria and four-factor RTSQ model indicated good fit, robust
χ2(df = 436, N = 304) = 734.10, p< 0.001, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.05 (see Table 6).
We conducted Wald chi-square tests of parameter constraints to examine differential rela-
tions between the PTSD-DYS factor and different factors of rumination (see Table 7). Results
yielded two significant findings, which showed that the PTSD-DYS factor related more to both
R-PFT (r = 0.49), Wald χ2(1, N = 304) = 8.50, p = 0.00, and R-AT (r = 0.49), Wald χ2(1, N =
304) = 6.82, p = 0.01, than R-CT (r = 0.35). No difference was found for dysphoria’s relation-
ship to R-PFT and R-RT (r = 0.40), Wald χ2(1, N = 304) = 2.76 p = 0.10, or R-PFT and R-AT,
Wald χ2(1, N = 304) = 0.01, p = 0.94. There were also no differences for the PTSD-DYS factor
between R-RT and R-CT, Wald χ2(1, N = 304) = 0.89, p = 0.34, and R-RT and R-AT, Wald
χ2(1, N = 304) = 2.59, p = 0.11.
We then conductedWald chi-square tests of parameter constraints to examine the relationship
between the PTSD-RE factor and the four factors of rumination (see Table 7). There were three
significant findings, specifically showing that R-AT (r = 0.43) related more to the PTSD-RE factor
than R-RT (r = 0.31), Wald χ2(1,N = 304) = 4.17, p = 0.04, and R-CT (r = 0.30), Wald χ2(1,N =
304) = 3.98, p = 0.05. Additionally, R-PFT (r = 0.41) was more related to PTSD-RE than R-CT (r
= 0.30), Wald χ2(1,N = 304) = 4.42, p = 0.04. No significant differences for PTSD-RE were found
between R-RT and R-CT, Wald χ2(1,N = 304) = 0.00, p = 0.98, R-RT and R-PFT, Wald χ2(1,N =
304) = 3.60, p = 0.06, and R-PFT and R-AT, Wald χ2(1,N = 304) = 0.20, p = 0.66.
Discussion
We evaluated the relationship between rumination and the PTSD-DYS factor, and between ru-
mination and the PTSD-RE factor, using the four-factor rumination model and the dysphoria
model of PTSD. Because of R-PFT’s relationship to faulty cognitive processing [12] and similari-
ties to the faulty processing seen as the result of rumination in the Ehlers and Clark [3] cognitive
model of PTSD, we hypothesized it would be the most related to PTSD-DYS and PTSD-RE.
Main Findings
Consistent with past research we found overall good fit for the dysphoria model [15]. We also
found a good fit for the four-factor rumination model derived from 15 items from the RTSQ
[12]. This confirms the four-factor model revealed by Tanner, Voon, Hasking and Martin [12].
This finding also provides additional support for rumination as a multi-dimensional construct
[12], in contrast to the unidimensional model originally proposed by Brinker and Dozois [11].
Lastly, we found a good fit for a combined dysphoria and rumination model. When examining
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factor-level relations, we partially confirmed our initial hypothesis that R-PFT would more re-
late to the PTSD-DYS and PTSD-RE factors over other rumination factors. Specifically, the
PTSD-DYS and PTSD-RE factor related more to R-PFT and R-AT than to R-CT. An addition-
al finding was that the PTSD-RE factor related more to R-AT than to R-RT.
Implications of Findings and Areas of Future Research
Results of the current study have several theoretical, research and clinical implications. First,
the R-PFT factor is best conceptualized as deficits in cognitive information processing and
problem-solving, and appears to be theoretically similar to the conceptualization of rumination
put forth by Nolen-Hoeksema [32] and the Rumination Sadness Scale [33]. Tanner, Voon,
Hasking and Martin [12] found that the problem-solving factor increased risk of psychological
distress. On the other hand, R-CT represents a way of thinking in which a person considers al-
ternative scenarios and imagines the alternative consequences. This can also be thought of as a
“what-if” style of thinking [12]. No relation was found between this factor and psychological
distress [12]. Therefore, because the PTSD-DYS factor is related to general emotional distress,
the outcome of dysphoria being more related to problem-focused thinking than counterfactual
Table 2. Standardized Factor Loadings for the PTSD Dysphoria Model.




Emotional cue reactivity 0.91
Physiological cue reactivity 0.86
Avoidance of thoughts 0.87
Avoidance of reminder 0.87
Trauma-related amnesia 0.55









Note. All factor loadings are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118435.t002
Table 3. Factor Correlations for the PTSD Dysphoria Model.
Factor Correlation Reexperiencing Avoidance Dysphoria Hyperarousal
Avoidance 0.90 1
Dysphoria 0.89 0.92 1
Hyperarousal 0.73 0.87 0.92 1
Note. All factor correlations are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118435.t003
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thinking is not surprising. Additionally, the relationship between R-PFT and PTSD-RE appears
to be clear because the faulty processing seen in R-PFT is consistent with the faulty processing
posited by Ehlers and Clark [3].
Second, the finding that the PTSD-DYS and PTSD-RE factor was more related to R-AT
than R-CT is interesting. In the Tanner, Voon, Hasking and Martin [12] study, they found that
R-AT appeared to have a protective factor against psychological distress; however, it was un-
known if this was due to future-oriented rumination that was positive in nature. Indeed, the
RTSQ appears to be ambiguous as to the nature of future-oriented thinking, so participants in
our sample could have been experiencing negative future-oriented thinking, as compared to
those in the Tanner, Voon, Hasking and Martin [12] study. Considering that, in the context of










When trying to solve a complicated problem, I ﬁnd that I just keep
coming back to the beginning, without ever ﬁnding a solution
0.70
I have never been able to distract myself from unwanted thoughts 0.74
Even if I think about a problem for hours, I still have a hard time
coming to a clear understanding
0.92
It is very difﬁcult for me to come to a clear conclusion about some
problems, no matter how much I think about it
0.86
Sometimes I realise I have been sitting and thinking about
something for hours
0.67
When I am expecting to meet someone, I will imagine every possible
scenario and conversation
0.50
I tend to replay past events as I would have liked them to happen 0.73
I ﬁnd myself daydreaming about things I wish I had done 0.80
When I feel I have had a bad interaction with someone, I tend to
imagine various scenarios where I would have acted differently
0.74
I ﬁnd that my mind goes over things again and again 0.81
When I have a problem, it will gnaw on my mind for a long time 0.83
I ﬁnd that some thoughts come to my mind over and over throughout
the day
0.88
I can’t stop thinking about some things 0.79
When I am looking forward to an exciting event, thoughts of it
interfere with what I am working on
0.68
If I have an important event coming up, I can’t stop thinking about it 0.79
Note. All factor loadings are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118435.t004
Table 5. Factor Correlations for the Four-Factor Rumination Model.
Factor Correlation Problem-Focused Thinking Counterfactual Thinking Repetitive Thinking Anticipatory Thinking
Counterfactual Thinking 0.71 1
Repetitive Thinking 0.62 0.67 1
Anticipatory Thinking 0.91 0.76 0.71 1
Note. All factor correlations are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118435.t005
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PTSD, people tend to ruminate about the causes and consequences of a traumatic event [6], fu-
ture-oriented thinking about the upcoming consequences of a traumatic event would result in
negative affect [7] due to faulty processing of the traumatic memory. It could be due to this
faulty processing and resulting negative affect that rumination’s anticipatory thinking factor
was more related to PTSD-DYS. When it comes to R-AT’s relation to PTSD-RE, if participants
in our sample were experiencing future-oriented ruminative thinking that was focused on con-
sequences of the trauma, this would have served as a constant reminder of the trauma itself,
possibly resulting in heightened reexperiencing symptoms.
Lastly, the additional finding that R-AT is more related than R-RT to PTSD-RE must be
considered. Since the intrusive images that are part of the PTSD-RE factor are not processed ef-
ficiently, this would result in more intrusive images and PTSD symptoms [7]. Although, intui-
tively, one would then expect PTSD-RE to be more related to R-RT due to repeated intrusive
images, the R-RT factor places more of an emphasis on the repetitive images, not the content.
It could be that the content of future ruminative thoughts serve as constant reminders that the
Table 6. Factor Correlations for the Combined Dysphoria Model of PTSD and Four-Factor Rumination Model.
Factor Correlation Problem-Focused Thinking Counterfactual Thinking Repetitive Thinking Anticipatory Thinking
Reexperiencing 0.41 0.30 0.31 0.43
Dysphoria 0.49 0.35 0.40 0.49
Avoidance 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.43
Hyperarousal 0.42 0.46 0.44 0.46
Note. All factor correlations are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118435.t006
Table 7. Correlations between the Four-Factor Rumination Model and PTSD’s Dysphoria Factor, and
the Corresponding Wald Test Values.
Path r (p-value) Path r (p-value) Wald χ2 (p-value)
PFT with DYS 0.49 (0.000) CT with DYS 0.35 (0.000) 8.14 (.00)**
PFT with DYS 0.49 (0.000) RT with DYS 0.40 (0.000) 2.76 (0.10)
PFT with DYS 0.49 (0.000) AT with DYS 0.49 (0.000) 0.01 (0.94)
CT with DYS 0.35 (0.000) RT with DYS 0.40 (0.000) 0.89 (0.34)
CT with DYS 0.35 (0.000) AT with DYS 0.49 (0.000) 5.96 (.01)*
RT with DYS 0.40 (0.000) AT with DYS 0.49 (0.000) 2.59 (0.11)
PFT with RE 0.41 (0.000) CT with RE 0.30 (0.000) 4.42 (0.04) *
PFT with RE 0.41 (0.000) RT with RE 0.31 (0.000) 3.60 (0.06)
PFT with RE 0.41 (0.000) AT with RE 0.43 (0.000) 0.20 (0.66)
CT with RE 0.30 (0.000) RT with RE 0.31 (0.000) 0.00 (0.98)
CT with RE 0.30 (0.000) AT with RE 0.43 (0.000) 3.98 (0.05) *
RT with RE 0.31 (0.000) AT with RE 0.43 (0.000) 4.17 (0.04) *
Note. PFT = Problem-Focused Thinking from RTSQ. CT = Counterfactual Thinking from RTSQ. RT =
Repetitive Thinking from RTSQ. AT = Anticipatory Thinking from RTSQ.
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traumatic event happened, which could lead to heightened re-experiencing symptoms. This
could account for PTSD-RE’s stronger co-relation with R-AT over R-RT.
The lack of other significant results is unexpected but suggests that only specific aspects of
rumination are related to PTSD. For example, perhaps counterfactual thinking could serve as a
protective factor because the person is imagining alternative scenarios that are more positive in
nature, leading to altered perceptions of the traumatic memory and/or more tempered PTSD
symptoms. Results also reflect the clinical importance of taking rumination into account when
treating victims of trauma exposure, particularly those experiencing PTSD symptoms. Specifi-
cally, results may suggest the importance of working on problem-solving skills with victims
that have been diagnosed with PTSD since their abilities to effectively process information
could be compromised. Additionally, the results suggest that understanding the way people
with PTSD are thinking about the future (particularly future consequences of the trauma)
could impact their ability to process the actual events of the trauma and resulting negative
mood. Skills utilized in trauma-focused therapy, such as cognitive restructuring about the
causes and consequences of traumatic event exposure [34] could focus on teaching clients the
actual realities of these consequences and working on their distorted beliefs surrounding the
anticipated consequences; additionally, focusing on teaching clients basic problem-solving
skills can go a long way in improving information processing of the traumatic event. Overall,
the results indicate the importance of identifying content of rumination and being able to ad-
dress it within a therapy context.
As this is a budding area of research, there are numerous avenues of research to be pursued.
First, future studies should consider comparing other PTSD factors to other factors of rumina-
tion beyond the PTSD-DYS and PTSD-RE factor. There could be facets of rumination that sim-
ply are not accounted for by the distress symptoms in the PTSD-DYS factor, and relate more to
other symptoms of PTSD beyond the intrusive thoughts aspect of the PTSD-RE factor. Further-
more, future studies should utilize DSM-5 data to compare PTSD factors to rumination factors.
DSM-5 has four PTSD factors [35] based on the emotional numbing model [14]. The current
study utilized DSM-IV data, so future studies should utilize data that reflect the most up to date
factor structure for PTSD. Finally, evaluating the malleability of rumination factors in relation
to specific PTSD factors is important to further refine treatment approaches to PTSD.
Strengths
There are several strengths to this study that should be noted. First, this is one of the first stud-
ies to examine rumination’s relations to PTSD at the factor level, using the updated four factor
models of both PTSD and rumination. Additionally, it also uses a more global measure of ru-
minative thinking, which does not confound the results with comorbid symptoms of depres-
sion and sadness, which could be the case with other questionnaires that measure rumination.
Lastly, Tanner, Voon, Hasking and Martin [12] investigated the factor structure of the RTSQ
in an adolescent sample. In this study, we extended these results by validating the factor struc-
ture they found in an adult sample.
Limitations
There are also limitations to this study that should be acknowledged. First is the use of self-
reported symptomatology. Second, although the RTSQ is a more global measure of ruminative
thinking, there are other measures that measure rumination in more specific circumstances
(e.g., rumination when depressed). There are possibly other measures of rumination that could
be utilized in future studies to understand rumination’s relationship to PTSD in specific con-
texts. Third, this study only compared the PTSD-RE and PTSD-DYS factors and rumination
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factors. Therefore, the current study does not investigate the full scope of PTSD’s relationship
with factors of rumination. Lastly, due to problems of shared method variance that can inflate
variables’ relationships, it would be prudent for future work to measure relationships between
PTSD factors and rumination factors using a mixed methods approach.
Overall, this study adds to the limited literature addressing rumination’s relationship with
PTSD. This study is novel in that it compares both constructs at the latent factor level, using a
newer factor model of rumination. As this is a relatively nascent area of research, this study
provides a strong foundation to address the limitations and pursue future areas of research in-
vestigating cognitive vulnerabilities to PTSD and PTSD factor structure.
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